Introduction
In writing their call for a 'new renaissance' for Europe, the European Research Area Board suggested a 'paradigm shift' in which completion of the ERA would be based upon a 'new social contract' creating a 'shared responsibility between science, policy and society', to ensure that science promoted 'socially beneficial action as well as freedom of thought' (EC 2009c) . This statement reflects a long shift from the 'republic of science' (Polanyi 1962) model in which science inhabits a neutral space which must not be tainted by political, social and ethical questions, to more recent constructivist models in which science and scientists are considered to be inextricably embedded in the social, economic and political world (Sturgis and Allum 2004) , and science and society are simultaneously co-constructed (Jasanoff 2006) . Along with this shift in thinking about the social aspects of science, there has also been a policy move away from 'deficit' models which claimed that public resistance is based on ignorance leading to irrational fear, and towards considering the public as having legitimate values-based questions to be asked about scientific research (Felt and Wynne 2007) .
This movement away from top-down 'government' to more reciprocal structures of 'governance' is reflected across policy discourse in advanced capitalist societies from the late 1990s onward, spurred by both the increasingly technological complexity of contemporary social conflicts, and the need to promote legitimacy for political systems which, although democratic, are visibly asymmetrical in power (Schmitter 2006 ' (art. 8b.2) , and tasked the European Commission specifically to 'carry out broad consultations with parties concerned ' (art. 8b.3) . In terms of science, technology and innovation (STI) policy, the Commission has been gradually increasing funding streams for research on the social impact of new technologies, and the discursive shift from deficit to engagement can also be seen in the renaming of programmes on Science and Society to Science in Society (Stirling 2006) , and in the framing of questions about multilevel governance of emergent fields such as nanotechnology, and what might constitute socially responsible innovation in the face of unknown risk (see, for example, Hellström 2003 , EC 2010a , Owen and Goldberg 2010 , Grunwald 2012 .
Although the details may differ (see Stahl 2012 , Owen et al. 2013 , von Schomberg 2013 , there is a general agreement that responsible forms of innovation should be aligned to social needs, be responsive to changes in ethical, social and environmental impacts as a research programme develops, and include the public as well as traditionally defined stakeholders in two-way consultation. This has recently been codified by the European Commission's Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG Research) into a policy framework for 'Responsible Research and Innovation' (RRI), which promises to promote innovation in accordance with
European social values by involving the public in all stages of the innovation process (EC 2012d) .
RRI is now embedded in Horizon 2020, which replaced the Framework Programmes as the instrument for governing allocation of research funding under the Innovation Union flagship in January 2014. However, responsible for what? and to whom? are questions which are difficult to operationalise at EU level, particularly in the face of ongoing financial and political instability, and it is possible that the more ambitious aspects of RRI will be diluted, rather than strengthened, by its embedding in the knowledge economy of the ERA. This paper will examine the emergence of RRI as a policy concept in the EU through a critical textual analysis of its formative documents, leading to a discussion of tensions revealed as RRI has made the journey from idea to policy.
Methodology
As RRI is a relatively recent policy object, a scoping study of documents issued by the various institutions of the EU, rather than a traditional literature review, Programme Making Science Public. Documents were initially gathered through keyword searches for 'responsible+research+and+innovation' and 'european+research+area' using the EU Bookshop as an online search portal, adding supplementary documents from the Bookshop, the Europa portal, and EUR-Lex as relevant to the discussions contained within these two key areas.
1 A database of 123 mainly Commission-authored or funded documents, as well as legal regulations and Treaties, was created from this process. 2 Of these, 78 (covering the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] discussed the structure and development of the ERA and 13 (from 2011-2013) discussed RRI, although only five of these could be considered formative documents, in the sense of supplying working definitions or concrete recommendations. 3 The documents were then subjected to a textual analysis, with the five formative documents considered as artefacts deployed specifically to imbue the new term with organisational meaning (Yanow 1993) . In the following sections, I will first discuss the formation of the ERA amid a changing discourse of innovation and growth, and then the process through which RRI was developed as a policy framework by the European Commission. I will then turn to an exploration of the tensions within RRI, between RRI and the ERA, and between RRI and policies emanating from other institutions within the EU before discussing some issues which could be further addressed.
Part I: Innovation in the context of the ERA
The connection between innovation and economic growth is not new in European policy discourse. The 1995 Green Paper on Innovation (COM(95) 688) refers to the pressures being placed on EU firms through competition with multinational enterprises which could lower production costs through global outsourcing, and with countries which were investing much more heavily in research and development (R&D). In particular, the Green Paper focussed on strategies for alleviating the 'European paradox', defined as a weakness in translating the region's strength in published scientific research into 'innovations and competitive advantages' (ibid: 5) which could make use of the single market. It called for policy intervention to 'stimulate the competitiveness and growth of European industry and…promote employment and the quality of life of Europe's citizens' (EC 1997, 4) .
Although the refrain is now familiar, at this time the stress was on strengthening Europe's global position through cooperation and knowledge-sharing between member states (MS), rather than by increasing internal competition. This produced a focus on how to put 'research more clearly in the context of innovation' (EC 1999, 32-33) for Framework Programme 5 (FP5, covering the years [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] and was reflected in its thematic priorities, which included Competitive and Sustained Growth, and three horizontal programmes on using research and innovation to achieve . However, these discussions were not confined to the Commission -a number of countries were similarly seeking ways to lead the field both scientifically, and in ways of gaining public approval before products entered the market. For example, the Royal Society in the UK commissioned a survey from which it concluded that the more aware of nanotechnology the respondent was, the more likely they were to agree it would be beneficial and should be developed ( Research and Innovation in Europe' (ibid: 21), does not appear in this form at all on the mind-map which produced the list. There, it is simply 'embedded' and appears to refer to the need to embed the framework of RRI into all aspects of the ERA.
Overall, however, the definitions derived by most of the working groups leaned towards defining 'responsible' as a moral imperative: environmentally protective, answering social needs, demonstrating 'shared European values', and beneficial to the widest range of actors. How these were to be operationalised was more heterogenous, with one working group suggesting a commitment to reflect the results of consultation in subsequent policy, a second suggesting stronger incentives for commercialisation of innovation, and a third considering RRI as a vision of the future, something which should be beyond the market. As such, therefore, these 'keys' are not necessarily specific to RRI or even to R&D policy, but are broadly the result of legal changes to the governance of the EU, and to an evolution in the understanding of the rights of citizens to have a say in how they are governed (see also EC 2013a).
By This statement also appears almost word-for-word in the new regulations proposed for the Euratom programme (COM(2011) 812 final, paras. 11.14, 15 and art.
13(1)), which is governed by its own treaty. However, of the five documents establishing the legal framework of Horizon 2020 it is mentioned only in these two, This document also considers that these models should be aimed at creating 'a favourable environment for investment', and that 'RRI processes constitute by themselves a growing "niche market" that some companies have already started to exploit' (ibid: 6), ideas which did not appear in the previous call. In its most recent opinion of Research and Innovation as Sources of Renewed Growth, the EESC (2014, Sec 1.3) has, in fact, asked for priority to be placed on the removal of administrative, economic and social obstacles to innovation and has objected to a 'concept of responsible conduct exclusively and explicitly in relation to R&I', on the grounds that all social activities are expected to comply with ethical and legal expectations and therefore research and innovation activities should not be singled out. RRI was also not directly mentioned in the overview of ex ante impact assessments, The Grand Challenge: The Design and Societal Impact of Horizon 2020, which tended to interpret 'public engagement' to mean bringing research and innovation 'to the attention of the general public' as part of their 'right to know how their money is invested' (Rechel et al. 2013, 152) , rather than as a citizen's right to influence policy and regulatory decisions on STI as members of the society which innovation will produce. This is to some extent also reflected in Options November 2013 at €78.6b (in current prices), 12 approximately €9b less than requested but still substantially more than FP7, which itself more than doubled the budget from 10 See <http://ec.europa.eu/research/swafs/index.cfm>. 11 Not to be confused with the European Council, which is composed of the 28 Heads of State, and sets the political and economic guidelines within which the EU Council must negotiate. 12 Current prices include 2% for yearly inflation, and are thus higher than constant prices, which are more often used for comparative purposes.
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. 13 While this can be seen as a victory by DG Research in using the nascent concept of RRI to convince the EU Council of the importance of adequate funding for research and innovation despite moves to cut the EU budget overall (Dratwa and Laurent 2013) , at the same time RRI's deployment through the ERA, which is legally bound to the economic goals of the European Council, raises other problems which may prove more difficult to solve.
To briefly sum, therefore, while the impetus towards creating an RRI framework has its roots in a discussion of a moral responsibility to make the trajectory of R&D socially beneficial as well as environmentally sustainable, particularly with regard to technologies with as-yet-unknown, global risks (as in von Schomberg 2007), pressure from other EU institutions and directives, exacerbated during the Euro crisis, has channeled RRI away from its original goal of creating a mutually responsive society, and more towards the imperative of speeding up innovation to produce immediate economic growth. It is possible that this is largely a result of timing and embeddedness in pre-existing structures which will need to find ways to produce their own reflexive engagement, but it may also signal that there are irreconcilable objectives inherent in the application of 'responsibility' to innovation, which are further complicated by the difficulties of creating mechanisms for truly meaningful bottom-up engagement within a supranational, multi-institutional, multi-cultural structure such as the EU. These points will be further developed in the next section.
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Part III: Responsible to whom? For what?
The documents discussed above suggest that in general, RRI has been understood as both a process and an outcome (Sutcliffe 2011, 7) . However, the aim of improving public involvement in shaping innovation towards technologies which will create social benefit, while simultaneously stimulating the pace of market-driven innovation as a means to restoring economic growth, may also explain some of the tensions presently inherent in RRI as a policy framework. Although Owen et al. (2012:752) have referred to an 'emerging zeitgeist' across the European political arena that a new kind of STI policy was needed to safeguard both the environment and the public interest against economic demands, Options still characterizes RRI as a process allowing 'stakeholders that are involved in the processes of research and innovation…to obtain relevant knowledge' (ibid: 3) so that public resistance can be avoided and market success ensured (see ibid: Annex II). In effect, the documents show alternately a research-oriented weighting towards ideas of democratic deliberative processes, ecological stewardship and specific problem-solving (although this has also been critiqued as a technological fix for the problems technology has created), and an innovation-oriented weighting towards 'challenges' as opportunities for creating, expanding and exploiting new markets.
Robinson's 2007 CTA workshop illustrates this tension well. Using futurebased scenarios, Robinson found that his participants were reading the concept of RRI in two ways: one with an emphasis on innovation, which meant ensuring that new products made it successfully to the market as a measure of responsible use of public R&D funds; and another with the emphasis on social and environmental responsibility, up to and including halting certain lines of R&D which were deemed to be too risky, even if these might be highly profitable (Robinson 2009 (Robinson , 1231 argued, there is also a question of whether 'science' in these policies is understood as an institution or as a practice, along with a tendency to conflate 'society' with 'the public' (Felt et al. 2013) . To this I would also add a tendency to conflate both with 'the market', and to assume that successful uptake of a product or service proves that it is socially beneficial. 'stakeholders' into processes of risk governance. The conclusion was that while risk consultation and management could undoubtedly benefit from greater inclusion of NGOs and CSOs, neither the public, nor scientists for that matter, should have direct involvement in the decision-making aspects of risk assessment. This suggests a third axis of tension between responsibility and innovation, one in which 'responsibility' is understood as liability, so that the majority of respondents agreed that the power to define and manage risk had to remain with those who could be held politically accountable for their decisions. By the same token, Options appears to uphold a normative assumption that the public need only feel included in the decision-making process through greater access to information; they do not actually need to be included through real sharing of directive power. There is also a question of whether even the best two-way public consultations can really produce useful knowledge for policymaking if only confined to discussions of technical risk. As Tyfield (2012, 157) argues, seeking to engage the public in consultative exercises where others retain control of the terms of the debate tends to exacerbate distrust and rejection. Citizens tend to be both more precautionary than policymakers (Dryzek et al. 2009 ) and simultaneously more weighted towards questions of personal, social and environmental impact (Sturgis and Allum 2004) , issues which can remain problematic if even a technology could be proven to be completely without risk --for example the ethics of marketing sterile GM plants in the developing world, where subsistence farmers must find cash to buy fresh seed each season instead of being able to conserve it from last year's crop. The Key of inclusive engagement, therefore, must apply not only to whom, but also to the topics, forms of evidence and expertise, and ways of warranting knowledge-claims which are accepted in such discussions, in order to avoid consultation becoming a matter of 'preparing the product for the market and the market for the product' (Thorpe and Gregory 2010, 273) . Since RRI has ultimately been framed as a solution to the original policy problem posed in the 1995 Green
Paper on Innovation, namely difficulty in translating publicly-funded research into products and services which can contribute to European economic growth, it cannot fulfil either its protective or economic obligations if the public cannot somehow indicate the nature and levels of its non-technical concerns to scientists, potential investors and policymakers, and feel that these will be taken seriously enough to might mean to ordinary Europeans are largely produced through broad commissioned surveys, such as the Eurobarometer, which allows citizens to voice an opinion, but is not a structure created for mutually responsive engagement. Another consultative mechanism, Your Voice in Europe, does allow members of the public to file a written response which must be considered by the Commission, but this must be confined to technical issues, and is thus difficult for ordinary people to use (see Badouard 2013 ).
At present, structures such as the new European Citizens' Initiative, which allows anyone to create a petition which must be addressed by the Commission if it receives 1,000,000 signatures (EC 2012b), or changes to the European Parliament itself, may provide some avenue for the public to make their concerns known, but these cannot support the collective re-imagining of science and social relations which RRI envisions. To do this, new consultative architectures will need to be developed, some of which may already be underway in projects recently funded. At the moment, however, there are serious and largely unaddressed questions about the knowledge politics embedded in deliberation and of deliberation as a methodology for producing the mutually responsive innovation society that RRI ideally envisions (van Oudheusden 2014), particularly when the real decision-making power lies with officials who must stand for re-election within different cultural and political systems.
The recent Eurobarometer on RRI showed that 35% of the European public feel that scientists definitely try to behave responsibly towards society with reference to STI, whereas only 10% thought that government definitely did, and 16% thought they definitely did not (EC 2013d). These figures suggest that if there is a crisis of legitimacy, it appears to be more political than scientific. They also suggest that if it is to truly incorporate social benefits, risks and impacts, RRI would have to be applied to the consultative processes of agencies that regulate the end-products of innovation, such as the European Food Standards Agency (EFSA), which at present require adherence to very strict standards, allowing only technical language discussing only technical risk (see, for example, Robinson et al. 2013, Hartley and Millar 2014) .
In terms of other policies, the ethical engagement demanded by RRI may also find itself in direct conflict with the ERA and with Innovation Union (COM (2010) 546 final), as both advocate less regulation in order to allow greater risk-taking in research and to bring innovations more quickly to the market (EC 2011a (EC , 2013b . This further complicates the tensions between 'responsible' as liable and accountable, 'responsible' as a form of moral action best deployed through processes of mutual learning and deliberation, and 'responsible' as ensuring that public money allocated towards research does eventually create products and services which fill that society's needs, rather than merely creating new opportunities for purchase. This leaves 'Responsible Research and Innovation' in danger of repeating the experience of 'Sustainable Development', which rapidly transformed into a 'green' or 'eco-friendly' market sector, creating new products and some better corporate practices, but without substantially changing the patterns of over-consumption it was originally devised to counter (Hume 2010) . Moreover, sixty years of perpetual growth in developed nations has not continued to increase overall happiness, health, or feelings of security; but rather has led to hyper-competition, casualisation of labour and rising levels of income inequality (Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2009, Hatgioannides and Karanassou 2011) . This may mean that there is, in fact, no correlation between growth as measured by GDP and fulfilling Europeans' social needs and goals. The question of what kind of technological society we wish to create is one that will also need a mutually responsive political economy in which RRI, as a critical as well as enabling process, is able to flourish. innovative European policy framework produces several tensions which will need to be addressed in order for RRI to become truly responsible to the needs, ambitions, and values of European society.
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Concluding thoughts
The first, and most obvious, tension has been a lack of official acknowledgement of the possibility that the ongoing, bottom-up engagement which is RRI's ideal may reveal that it is necessary to change or even halt a trajectory of research, or discuss how RRI might be applied to existing technologies which have already incited widespread public resistance, in order to determine whether they should continue to be developed with public funds. Moral, ethical and social questions are still often excluded from consultation structures, and deficit models which suggest that resistance to technology is merely based in a lack of 'correct' information have so far proven very difficult to dislodge. There are also presently no structures in place which allow meaningful exchange about STI policy between policymakers and citizens-at-large. Insofar as can be seen as of this writing, the moral underpinning of the RRI framework is likely to continue to struggle under the weight of political determination to return to pre-crisis levels of economic growth. The language of Innovation Union shifts public trust from an aspect of creating scientific legitimacy to a pre-condition for attracting venture capital and ensuring smooth take-up of innovation, and casts scientific research as ultimately purposeful only if aimed towards bringing new products to the market. Rather than supporting RRI's capacity for innovating innovation policy, this may limit RRI's ability to fulfill its potential for reconfiguring 'responsible' as protective, ethical, and socially desirable, rather than merely liable. This will mean that instead of creating legitimacy for a European Union whose moves toward deeper integration are strengthened by greater citizen involvement in both political and scientific governance, there is a risk that RRI will remain a vague set of hopeful 'Keys' which must be incorporated into funding proposals, but do not significantly influence the norms, discourses and functions of other institutions in the EU, including those involved in regulating the end products of scientific research. Thus, although RRI has at times been presented as a way of protecting society and the environment from instrumental economic demands, without a concurrent paradigm shift in the way European politicians think about science and social relations, and about growth economics and the purpose of innovation, its deeper potential may become lost within policies which are designed to mould a knowledgebased economy in the image of a production-based single market..
